Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is part of the Bill of Rights, guards against unreasonable searches and seizures.

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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Searches and seizures with warrants

Warrants must be issued by a magistrate or judicial officer. The officer need not be a judge, but must not be involved in the process of law enforcement; he must be "neutral and detached."

The Fourth Amendment provides that warrants may issue only upon "probable cause," a phrase whose exact definition is not found in the Constitution, but is rather based on judicial interpretation. Mere assertions by a witness that an individual committed a crime do not constitute probable cause; it is necessary for the witness to describe the basis of such assertions. Furthermore, the witness must also provide evidence of his or her credibility. In Jones v. United States (1960), the Supreme Court held that the affidavit must be considered as a whole in determining the basis of the affiant's information and its credibility. In Aguilar v. Texas (1964), however, the Supreme Court rejected the "totality" test, holding that the basis of information and credibility were to be determined separately. In Illinois v. Gates (1983), the Court once again returned to the totality test, rejecting the idea that credibility and basis for information should be considered separately. Justice William Rehnquist held that "a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other."

The seizure of "contraband and the fruits and instrumentalities of crime" has never been questioned. In Gouled v. United States (1921), the Supreme Court held that items could not be seized merely for the purpose of utilizing them as evidence. The Court decided that the confiscation of evidence that the defendant had no desire to turn over constituted forcing the defendant to incriminate him or herself, an action prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. The decision was overturned in Warden v. Hayden (1967); the Court held that the items seized were not "testimonial or communicative in nature, and their introduction therefore did not compel respondent to become a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment." Under Andreson v. Maryland (1976), the Supreme Court held that as long as the defendant is not compelled to authenticate them, documents could be admitted as evidence, even if they were "testimonial" in nature.

Books, movies and other forms of media are subject to seizure, in order to enforce obscenity laws or otherwise, though the courts must carefully scrutinize the seizure in order to ensure that freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment is not violated. At a minimum, officers require a warrant to seize literature. The assertions of a police officer are not sufficient basis for the issuance of a warrant; the issuer of the warrant must make an inquiry into the factual basis of the conclusions drawn. For example, the magistrate may not issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of several copies of an allegedly obscene book from a publisher without first examining a sample of the publication in question. The Fourth Amendment's requirement that the warrant "particularly" describe the things to be seized is interpreted strictly; in Stanford v. Texas (1965), for example, the Supreme Court invalidated a warrant that authorized the seizure of literature "concerning the Communist Party of Texas" on the grounds of lack of particularity.

At common law, an officer could not break in to a home, even when authorized by warrant, unless after announcing his authority and purpose he was refused admittance. The Supreme Court has held that, in most circumstances, a reasonable search had to be preceded by an announcement made by the police officer. In some situations, the "knock and announce" rule does not apply, for instance when the officers reasonably believe that the destruction of evidence would ensue were they to make such an announcement.

Searches and seizures without warrants

A warrant is not necessary for a search or seizure under certain circumstances. Officers may search and seize objects that are in "plain view." Before the search and seizure, however, the officers must have probable cause to believe that the objects are contraband. Similarly, "open fields"—pastures, open water, woods and other such areas—may be searched without warrant, on the basis that the individuals conducting activities therein had no reasonable expectations of privacy.

The Supreme Court has also held that individuals in automobiles have a reduced expectation of privacy, because vehicles generally do not serve as residences or repositories of personal effects. Vehicles may not be randomly stopped and searched; there must be probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Items in "plain view" may be seized; areas that could potentially hide weapons may also be searched. With probable cause, police officers may search any area in the vehicle. They may not, however, extend the search to the vehicle's passengers.

Under common law, a police officer could arrest an individual (arrests constituting seizures, at least for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment) if that individual committed a misdemeanor in the officer's presence, or if the officer had probable cause to believe that the individual committed a felony. The Supreme Court has applied the common law rule in American jurisprudence. The officer in question must have had probable cause before making the arrest; evidence discovered after the arrest may not be retroactively used to justify the arrest.

Another common law rule—that permitting searches incident to an arrest without warrant—has been applied in American law. The justification for such a search is that the arrested individual must be prevented from destroying evidence or using a weapon against the arresting officer. In Trupiano v. United States (1948), the Supreme Court held that "a search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest. But there must be something more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest." In United States v. Rabinowitz (1950), the Court reversed its previous ruling, holding that the officers' opportunity to obtain a warrant was not germane to the reasonableness of a search incident to an arrest. The decision suggested that any area within the "immediate control" of the arrestee could be searched, but it did not define the term. In 1969, deciding Chimel v. California, the Supreme Court elucidated its previous decisions. It held that when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the officer to search the arrestee for weapons and evidence. Similarly, it was held that it is reasonable for the officer to search the area within the arrestee's immediate control, that is, the area from which the defendant may gain access to a weapon or evidence. A search of the room in which the arrest is made is therefore permissible, but the same is not true of a search of other rooms, as the arrestee would not probably be able to access weapons or evidence in those rooms at the time of arrest.

Searches in public schools, it has been held, require neither warrants nor probable cause. It is merely necessary that the searching officers have reasonable grounds for believing that the search will result in the finding of evidence of illegal activity. Government offices may be searched for evidence of work-related misconduct by government employees on similar grounds. The reasonable grounds standard is further applied to searches of homes of individuals on probation. Searches of prison cells are subject to no restraints relating to reasonableness or probable cause; neither are searches conducted at the border. Finally, searches may be conducted if the target thereof gives consent.

Exclusionary rule

At common law, all evidence, no matter how seized, could be admitted in court. In Weeks v. United States (1914), however, the Supreme Court adopted the "exclusionary rule," whereby evidence seized unlawfully was declared inadmissible in court. The rule mainly serves as a deterrent to police officers seeking to conduct unlawful searches and seizures; it has, however, a number of exceptions. In United States v. Leon (1984), the Supreme Court applied the "good faith" rule: evidence seized by officers objectively and in good faith relying on a warrant that was later found to be defective was still deemed admissible. If an officer dishonestly or recklessly prepares an affidavit forming the basis of the warrant, if the issuing magistrate abandons his neutrality or if the warrant lacks particularity, however, evidence seized pursuant to the warrant would still be excluded. It is unclear if the "good faith" exception applies to warrantless seizures.

A defendant may ask for evidence to be excluded only if its seizure violated his own Fourth Amendment rights. The defendant may not assert the rights of a third party.

References

• Constitution of the United States. (http://sources.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_United_States_of_America)
• Kilman, Johnny and George Costello (Eds). (2000). The Constitution of the United States of America: Analyis and Interpretation. (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/browse.html)